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RECENT DECISIONS
erty owned by corporations organized in neutral countries. Conse-
quently, enemies could not avoid seizure of their property by incor-
porating under the laws of neutral countries.19
Under Section 9 of the original Act, any non-enemy has a right
to recover confiscated property from the Alien Property Custodian
upon proof of "any interest, right or title." 20 In two suits involving
assets of a corporation whose stock had been seized by the Alien
Property Custodian, the courts declined to pierce the "corporate veil"
and ruled that the United States acquired only the rights of a stock-
holder, which do not include title to the property of the corporation.21
In the instant case, the Court has recognized a severable inter-
est of the stockholders in specific assets of the corporation. The
right to intervene was not decided upon any derivative or representa-
tive foundation, as was the issue in the district court.22  No legal
title having been asserted, the Court has apparently decreed an equi-
table interest sufficient.
The majority opinion speaks of "an interest [of the stockholders]
in the assets proportionate to their stock holdings . " 23 but neither
defines the interest nor cites authority for its recognition. Justice
Reed, in the dissenting opinion, asserts that the Court has disregarded
the corporate entity in declaring a present interest of stockholders
in the physical property of an unliquidated corporation. Since a
stockholder has such a severable interest under the provisions of this
legislation, query: Would such an interest be recognized in actions
for relief from other confiscatory acts of the Government, such as
the exercise of the right of eminent domain 24 over corporate
property?
DOMESTIc RELATIONS - ADOPTION - RELIGIOUS BELIEFS OF
CHILD AND FOSTER PARENTS.-Petitioners in this adoption proceed-
ing had obtained the necessary records,' and the consent of the natu-
10See Kaufman v. Societe Internationale, 72 Sup. Ct. 611, 612 (1952).
20 40 STAT. 411, 419, 50 U. S. C. App. § 9 (1946). See Standard Oil Co. of
N. J. v. Markham, 57 F. Supp. 332 (D. C. S. D. N. Y. 1944); Pflueger v.
United States, 121 F. 2d 732 (D. C. Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U. S. 617 (1941).
21 Schering Corp. v. Gilbert, 153 F. 2d 428 (2d Cir. 1946) ; Knitting Ma-
chine Corp. v. Hayward Hosiery Co., 95 F. Supp. 510 (D. C. Mass. 1950).
22 Societe Internationale v. McGrath, 90 F. Supp. 1011 (D. D. C. 1950).
23 Kaufman v. Societe Internationale, 72 Sup. Ct. 611, 614 (1952).
24 "In the ordinary condemnation case the award in favor of the owners of
the land condemned stands in lieu of the land .... [O]nly those who had an
estate in the land have an interest in the fund which takes its place." Oliver
v. United States, 156 F. 2d 281, 283 (8th Cir. 1946).
I ANN. LAws MASS., c. 210, § 5A (1950) (requires investigation by, and
report from, welfare agency).,
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ral mother.2  The Probate Court denied the petition because the
petitioners' religious affiliations differed from those of the child's
natural parents.3 On appeal, the Court reversed, and held that the
adoption statute does not require that a child's custody be given only
to those of the same religious belief as the child's natural parents.4
Petition of Gaily, 107 N. E. 2d 21 (Mass. 1952).
The practice of adoption 5 was part of ancient Roman law,6
under which, it "... . was an act by which a person undertook to rear
the child of another, and appoint such child as his heir." 7 Subse-
quently, the countries of continental Europe, which derived their sys-
tems of jurisprudence from the Roman law, gave adoption legal
recognition.8
The right of adoption was unknown to the common law,9 and
exists today only by virtue of statute in both England 10 and the
common law jurisdictions of the United States." Massachusetts
was one of the first such jurisdictions to enact an adoption statute, 1
and New York followed suit some years later, in 1873.13 Although
adoption statutes are in derogation of the common law, and hence
should be strictly construed,'1 4 the modern tendency is to construe
them liberally, so as to favor the child.15
2 ANN. LAws MASS., C. 210, § 2 (1950) (requires consent of the natural
parent).
3 The decree indicated that this conclusion was reached "... in view of
the provisions of . . ." ANN. LAws MASS., c. 210, § 5B, added in 1950,
which provides in substance that, when practicable, adoptive parents must be
of the same religion as the child. Petition of Gally, 107 N. E. 2d 21, 23
(Mass. 1952).
4 Ronan, J., dissenting.
5 "Adoption has been defined to be the act by which the relations of pater-
nity and affiliation are recognized as legally existing between persons not so
related by nature." Matter of Session, 70 Mich. 297, 38 N. W. 249, 253 (1888).
6 See Appeal of Woodward, 81 Conn. 152, 70 Atl. 453, 458 (1908) ; Hock-
aday v. Lynn, 200 Mo. 456, 98 S. W. 585 (1906).
7 See Ballard v. Ward, 89 Pa. 358, 361 (1879).
8 See Ross v. Ross, 129 Mass. 243, 262 (1880); Matter of Thorne, 155
N. Y. 140, 143, 49 N. E. 661, 662 (1898).
9 See Matter of Taggart, 160 Cal. 493, 213 Pac. 504, 506 (1923) ; Betz v.
Horr, 276 N. Y. 83, 86, 11 N. E. 2d 548, 550 (1937) ; Matter of Carrol, 219
Pa. 440, 68 Atl. 1038, 1039 (1908).
10 16 & 17 GEo. 5, c. 29 (1926).
11 Matter of Thorne, supra note 8; see Matter of a Minor, 144 F. 2d 644,
646 (D. C. Cir. 1944) ; Matter of Cohen, 155 Misc. 202, 205, 279 N. Y. Supp.
427, 432 (Surr. Ct. 1935).
12 Laws of Mass. 1851, c. 324; see Ross v. Ross, 129 Mass. 243, 252 (1880).
13 Laws of N. Y. 1873, c. 830; see United States Trust Co. v. Hoyt, 150
App. Div. 621, 624, 135 N. Y. Supp. 849, 851, 852 (1st Dep't 1912).
14 "As the law of adoption is in derogation of the common law, nothing can
be assumed, presumed or inferred, and what is not found in the statute law is a
matter for the Legislature to supply and not for the courts." Matter of
Monroe, 132 Misc. 279, 281, 229 N. Y. Supp. 476, 478 (Surr. Ct. 1928); see
Krakow v. Dep't of Public Welfare, 326 Mass. 452, 95 N. E. 2d 184, 186
(1950).
I5 " 'The prevailing tendency at the present time is in the direction of liberal
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The paramount consideration in adoption proceedings is the
"welfare of the child." 16 Would-be foster parents must therefore
be financially and emotionally secure, and possess good character, and
be willing to support, educate, and rear the child as if it were their
own.17 The consideration given to the religion of the parties depends
upon the policy of the state, and the construction of the local adoption
statute. In Massachusetts, for example, prior to the enactment of
the statute construed in the instant case, religion was merely an in-
cidental factor to be taken in conjunction with the material elements
in determining what was best for the child's welfare.18 The court
had complete discretion regarding religion.19 New York, on the
other hand, attaches great weight to the religion of the child, con-
sidering also, of course, the usual criterion of the child's general
welfare.20
Many states have enacted statutes expressly emphasizing the
importance of the child's religion.21  New York, one of these states,
has construed its statute as a legislative mandate leaving no area for
judicial discretion. 22 In 1950, Massachusetts enacted a similar law,
providing that the judge, when practicable, must give custody of the
child only to persons of the same religion as the child.23
The instant case is the first to construe this recent Massachusetts
law.24  In effect, the instant opinion states that this statute does not
construction' of such acts to promote the legislative purpose." Matter of Jaren,
223 Minn. 561, 27 N. W. 2d 656, 660 (1947). "Since these statutes confer a
beneficial interest they are to be liberally construed ... " Fletcher v. Flanary,
185 Va. 409, 38 S. E. 2d 433, 434 (1946).
16 See Krakow v. Dep't of Public Welfare, spra note 14; see 2 C. J. S.
425, n. 52 (1952), for cases cited.
17 See Ross v. Ross, 129 Mass. 243, 262 (1880).
18 Purinton v. Jamrock, 195 Mass. 187, 80 N. E. 802 (1907).
'1 Id., 80 N. E. at 805.
20 Matter of Anonymous, 195 Misc. 6, 88 N. Y. S. 2d 829 (Surr. Ct. 1949);
Matter of Korte, 78 Misc. 276, 139 N. Y. Supp. 444 (Co. Ct. 1912); cf. Matter
of Crickard, 52 Misc. 63, 102 N. Y. Supp. 440 (Surr. Ct. 1906); Matter of
Jacquet, 40 Misc. 575, 82 N. Y. Supp. 986 (Surr. Ct. 1903).
21 Ir .REv. STAT. c. 23, § 299bl (1951); IowA CODE §§ 232.24, 235.3 (Bar-
low & Faupel, 1950) ; MINN. STAT. § 260.20 (1949) ; Mo. REv. STAT. §§ 211.140,
457.170 (1949); Na. REv. STAT. §43-216 (1943); N. Y. Dom. REL. LAw§ 113; N. Y. Soc. Wz.F. LAw § 373(3, 4, 5); N. Y. C. Doai. RmL. CT. AcT
§§86(3), 88; OHIO CODE c. 8, §1639-33 (Baldwin, 1948); PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 11, §252 (Purdon, 1933).
22 Matter of Santos, 278 App. Div. 373, 105 N. Y. S. 2d 716 (1st Dep't
1951). N. Y. C. Dom. RE. CT. Acr § 88(4) provides that the child's "... re-
ligious faith shall be preserved and protected by the court." "To this, the
children have a natural and legal right of which they cannot be deprived by
their temporary exposure to the culture of another religion prior to the age of
reason." Id. at 375, 105 N. Y. S. 2d at 718.
23 ANN. LAws MAss., c. 210, § 5B, added by Laws of Mass. 1950, c. 737, § 3.
24 Krakow v. Dep't of Public Welfare, 326 Mass. 452, 95 N. E. 2d 184
(1950), would have been the first to construe this law had not the petition
been denied for failure to comply with Section 5A, which required a public
welfare report. The New York policy against the adoption of children by
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make it mandatory on the court to give custody of the child only to
those of the same religion.25  The dissenting opinion points out that
since the pertinent Massachusetts and New York statutes regarding
the religious consideration are nearly identical, and since the Massa-
chusetts statute was patterned after that of New York, it should be
given the same interpretation as in New York-namely, that the re-
ligion of the child be considered with as much, if not more, emphasis
than its material welfare.2 6
The majority opinion is not sound. The court is the protector
of the child, and its primary concern is the child's welfare. It is in-
conceivable, therefore, that a judge may jeopardize the religion of a
helpless child by permitting its adoption into a family of different
religious affiliations. As evidenced by the instant decision, the court
is in effect claiming that it has the same prerogative of uninhibited
discretion now, as it had before the new statute was added.27 Does
the law exist for naught? Yes, if the judge may disregard the man-
date and freely pursue his own course.
As the dissent implied, the spiritual benefit of retaining one's
own religion is of a higher nature, and greater value to a child,
whether or not he now realizes it, than the material benefits he may
reap by adoption into a wealthy family of different religious beliefs. 28
Although that family may sincerely offer him the best in life, the fact
remains that the child's religion may be torn from him. The uni-
versal standard in adoption proceedings, "the welfare of the child,"
should therefore be construed to include its spiritual as well as its
material welfare. The legislature apparently felt that no man, or
body of men, has the right to expose a child to the possible loss of
its original faith, by allowing its adoption into a family of different
religious affiliations: the child is to be reared in the faith into which
it was born.
A
EQUITY-INJUNCTION-PROPERTY RIGHT IN USE OF MARITAL
NAME.-Defendant-husband obtained an ex parte Mexican divorce,1
those of a different religious belief, was responsible for petitioners' failure to
obtain the necessary report.
-5 See Note, 23 A. L. R. 2d 701 (1952), and cases collected therein.
26 See Petition of Gally, 107 N. E. 2d 21, 29, 30 (Mass. 1952).
27 The statutory use of the phrase, "when practicable," may have induced the
court to assume that it should exercise its discretion according to the attendant
facts and circumstances, and decree accordingly. Id., 107 N. E. 2d at 25.28 See id., 107 N. E. 2d at 28.
'Following principles of comity, the court determined the plaintiff's mar-
ital status by holding this decree void, inasmuch as it was procured by a New
York resident on a twenty-four hour visit.
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